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1 Methodology
The DEFINE project (2012–2015) is run by EUA in collaboration with CIPES, the
Centre for Research in Higher Education Policies (PT), and the Universities of
Oxford (UK), Aalto (FI) and Erlangen-Nuremberg (DE), and the Copenhagen
Business School (DK). It is co-funded by the European Union under the Lifelong
Learning Programme.
Research has been conducted within the framework of the DEFINE project in
three phases.1 The data collection was ﬁrst organised at system level through
various rounds of consultations, questionnaires and interviews with National
Rectors’ Conferences, seeking to establish a detailed understanding of public
funding mechanisms and their development over the past decade, identify frequent
issues, and build a list of case studies for mergers and concentration measures. At
this stage also a fourth pillar on operational efﬁciency measures at institutional level
was integrated into the project structure as it appeared to be an important issue in
several systems. This system level data, together with updated data of EUA’s Public
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Funding Observatory,2 enabled the project team to develop funding proﬁles of 24
European university systems.3
In addition, qualitative information focusing on the institutional level was
obtained through self-evaluation exercises and site visits of three higher education
institutions selected for their experience with the topics and mechanisms under
scrutiny,4 as well as a seminar with university managers from across Europe
organised in cooperation with HUMANE (Heads of University Management and
Administration Network in Europe).
All of the above paved the way for three thematic focus groups. These groups
gathered university leaders and managers with signiﬁcant experience in the topic
addressed (performance-based funding; merger and concentration processes;
funding for excellence). The focus group format aimed to elicit feedback from
practitioners on the impact and unintended consequences of the mechanisms ana-
lysed, and provide suggestions for improvement.
The analysis was presented to the wider university community on the occasion
of the European University Association’s Second Funding Forum in Bergamo, Italy
in October 2014, which was used for validation and additional collection of case
studies. Afterwards thematic reports and a ﬁnal summary publication were released
in 2015.
2 Funding of Higher Education Institutions
The European University Association’s work on the ﬁnancial sustainability of
universities has previously focused on the opportunities and challenges associated
to the attraction of diverse income sources (Thomas and Pruvot 2011) and the
development of adequate ﬁnancial management tools such as full costing (Thomas
et al. 2008, 2013). EUA has also set up a Public Funding Observatory to monitor
the development of trends in public funding for universities throughout Europe on
an annual basis since 2008.
This paper primarily addresses evolutions in the ways public funding is deliv-
ered to universities, and how public authorities seek to calibrate these modalities to
improve funding efﬁciency in the system. Early observations show that, while some
funding tools are widely used in the countries considered in the analysis, they tend
2The annual reports since 2008 and the online tool are available here: http://www.eua.be/
publicfundingobservatory.be.
3Austria, Belgium-Flanders, Belgium-French speaking community, Switzerland Czech Republic,
Germany-Brandenburg, Germany-Hesse, Germany-North-Rhine Westphalia, Denmark, Estonia,
Spain-Catalonia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom-England.
4Copenhagen Business School on the Danish taximeter system; Aalto University on the merger
process and the University Erlangen-Nuremberg on the German Excellence Initiative.
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to cover different realities, thus making comparisons challenging. To understand
these different realities one ﬁrst needs to look at the overall funding context in each
system.
2.1 Income Structures
Where system averages are available, public funding represents between 50 and
90 % of the universities’ income structures. There have often been signiﬁcant
changes in the modalities through which public funding is delivered. In addition,
one should bear in mind the important cuts made in the budgets for universities in a
number of countries since 2008, which are described in EUA’s Public Funding
Observatory. In 2014, 15 systems had lower public funding available to higher
education institutions than in 2008 (taking inflation into account).5 Given the
importance of this funding source for universities, changes in both the nature and
overall amount potentially have the greatest effect on universities’ long-term
ﬁnancial sustainability.
In 2013 tuition and administrative fees represented typically around 5 % or less
of the universities’ income in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Sweden), as well as in Austria, Belgium (both systems), the Czech
Republic, Estonia, France and Germany.6
In nine countries tuition fees represented 10 % or more of the universities’
average income, and, as such, constitute the most important income source after
public funding. Those include Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Latvia,
Poland, Slovakia and Spain, as well as the United Kingdom. However, as public
authorities in many cases can decide about the introduction, abolishment or level of
tuition fees, this income source can fluctuate considerably.
Generating additional income from other sources is therefore perceived as more
and more necessary for the long-term ﬁnancial sustainability of universities, and
expectations of public authorities around this are rising. Here, we consider income
generated by research contracts and provision of services (such as renting of facil-
ities, catering services, consultancy, etc.), philanthropic funding, and, when possible,
European funding.7 Overall, these types of additional income sources exceed 10 %
of the average universities’ income in most systems (Thomas and Pruvot 2011,
p. 27). A worrying trend though is that in some countries, national authorities tend to
perceive European funds as a mechanism to compensate decreases in national public
funding for the sector. This is problematic, not only because of the signiﬁcant
5http://www.eua.be/publicfundingobservatory.
6Estonia and Germany have recently abolished tuition fees for students completing their studies
within the regular timeframe/obtaining a certain number of ECTS per year.
7It should be noted that European funds are not always identiﬁable in the universities’ income
structure; this may be for instance the case of structural funds, which are delivered by the national
or regional authorities, and may be thus labelled as national/regional funds.
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amount of co-funding required, but also because European funds are allocated on a
competitive basis—success in the competition requires institutional capacities and
resources that in turn depend on ﬁnancial means.
2.2 Public Funding Modalities
In most systems public authorities distribute funding to universities through block
grants (see Fig. 1). The overall amount of the block grant may be determined in
different ways though, through negotiation, on a historical basis, via a funding
formula or through a performance contract. Often these elements are combined,
meaning a part of the block grant is negotiated, another part might be determined on
a historical basis, and again another part via a funding formula or a contract. The
importance of these different elements in determining the overall amount of the
block grant varies across the systems.
Public funding is also increasingly distributed based on competition, often
through calls for project proposals, notably for research. Finally, other direct
funding mechanisms also exist, such as targeted/earmarked funding for speciﬁc
purposes, which may be allocated on a competitive basis, such as the Strategic
Innovation Funding in Ireland, established as a mechanism for institutional
restructuring and modernisation. Such funding may also be allocated directly to
institutions (non-competitive): this is the case for the Higher Education Innovation
Funding scheme in the United Kingdom, which focuses on knowledge exchange, or
the “Successful Bachelor degrees” plan in France, which funds concrete measures
aiming at improving the overall success rate in Bachelor degrees (e.g. individual
supervision, new teaching methods).
Although formula-based block grants are the main way of delivering public
funding in almost two thirds of the systems considered, negotiated block grants
remain the most important mechanism in some big systems like France and Italy
Fig. 1 Public funding
allocation mechanisms
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and a few smaller ones (see Table 1). Most countries however, have a mix of
different allocation modalities, and a ﬁrst analysis shows a great diversity between
systems. The following table gives an overview of allocation mechanisms for block
grants across the systems considered and is a ﬁrst attempt to group them.
3 Performance-Based Funding
The term performance-based funding is being used more and more often in dis-
cussions on university funding policy at national, as well European levels.
However, it is understood very differently across Europe. In many cases it is used as
a synonym for formula-based funding, often without taking into account the “input”
or “output” related nature of the criteria used in the formula. Often,
performance-based funding is also perceived as competitive funding due to the fact
that it is used to distribute a ﬁxed amount of money to institutions based on their
relative performance. Performance or development contracts, and target agreements
whereby certain goals are agreed between the funder and universities are also
associated with performance-based funding, although they do not always have a
direct impact on funding and are of different nature.
Table 1 An overview of allocation mechanisms for block grants across Europe
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3.1 Funding Formulae
In many systems with formula funding, input indicators such as student numbers (at
Bachelor level, then at Master level) often play the most important role in deter-
mining the amount of funding a university gets via a block grant. The corresponding
output-oriented indicators (number of Bachelor and Master degrees) are used less
frequently and or have often less weight in a formula. It is interesting to note the
importance of some output-oriented criteria, which are usually linked to research
output: doctoral degrees, international/European funding and external funding are
considered the most important criteria, followed by teaching-related output criteria
of Master and Bachelor degrees and ECTS points. Other commonly used output
indicators are research evaluations and research contracts.
Current important policy priorities like internationalisation and student and staff
mobility are also mirrored in funding formulae in several systems, through indi-
cators such as the number of international students and albeit to a lesser extent the
number of international staff. Denmark, for instance, uses an “internationalisation
taximeter”, granting the Danish universities a ﬁxed amount per outgoing and
incoming student. Finland takes account of the universities’ international teaching
and research personnel in its funding model, and all internationalisation-related
criteria (including competitive international research funding) count for 9 % of the
public funding.
The set of indicators is crucial, as the interplay of different indicators determines
the effects the formula might have on universities. Negative effects on the quality of
teaching and research are debated with regard to several indicators. Here are just a
few examples:
Formulae heavily relying on study completion bear the risk of a decrease in
quality and standards to foster quicker completion. This may lead to bigger
classrooms, as universities try to take-in as many students as possible without
increasing the number of teaching staff or courses. This risk might be mitigated, for
instance, through the combination of study completion criteria with more
input-oriented indicators such as student and staff numbers, as well as the imple-
mentation of internal quality assurance mechanisms and the development of quality
culture within the institution.
Bibliometric criteria tend to privilege natural and social sciences over humani-
ties, as they more heavily rely on empirical research which translates into a higher
number of publications. Furthermore, bibliometric criteria bear the risk of a
decrease in quality if used too excessively, as they then foster slicing of papers and
name dropping in publications. Therefore, bibliometric criteria should not be the
only measure to allocate research funding. Discipline speciﬁc criteria need to be
added to compensate for the potential risks.
External funding, which may be acquired through research contracts with private
partners, EU funds, or other types of competitive funding or philanthropic sources,
appears quite frequently as indicator in funding formula, which, in turn, sets the
value of the core funding that the university receives. Creating a direct link between
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external funding and core funding may be used as an incentive for universities to
actively develop partnerships, and strengthen income diversiﬁcation strategies.
However, if this incentive is used, it needs to take account of the fact that external
funding often only offers partial coverage of costs. Universities then need to bridge
the gap with their core resources. For it to be a sustainable mechanism, an increase
in external funding obtained by the university needs to be coupled with a growth of
the formula-based block grant, to cover the co-funding required by European and
international funding programmes, as well as the indirect costs research and pro-
jects funded by those, as they are usually not fully covered. Reduced core resources
will create additional barriers for universities to successfully obtain external funding
because of a lesser capacity to bridge the associated funding gap (see Thomas et al.
2013, p. 12).
Also, indicators that are difﬁcult to influence by universities should be used with
caution. This is especially the case when criteria related to graduate employability
are used (for example in Finland or Italy), and the quality of the teaching provided
at the institution is only one of the determining factors. The institutional influence
on student numbers may be limited by central regulation in some systems; legal
provisions may also, for instance, hinder the capacity to attract international staff.
More broadly, external factors such as the system-level regulatory frameworks, the
general economic context, and the local environment or community in which the
university develops its activities may have a stronger influence on the university’s
score for some criteria than the university itself, which undermines the assumed
neutrality of a formula.
3.2 Performance Contracts
Another way of steering institutional behaviour is through so-called performance
contracts, target agreements or development contracts, whereby certain goals are
agreed between public authorities and universities. These are a common feature
found in 15 of the systems considered in the study. However, they are of very
different nature, and only in a few cases they do have a direct and clear impact on
funding. Here are a few examples to illustrate the differences:
In Austria for instance, the contract is the outcome of a budget negotiation
between the ministry and each university to determine the amount of funding per
institution, whereby the minimum level is preﬁxed by law. The achievement of the
contract’s objectives can have an impact on the negotiations for the next funding
period.
In the Netherlands, performance contracts were introduced in 2012 and since
then a set amount of the block grant (currently 7 %) is distributed on the basis of
objectives agreed between the Ministry of Education and individual universities in
these contracts. After three years, a review commission will assess whether these
objectives have been met, however it is to be seen whether this will then really have
a direct impact on funding.
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In Brandenburg and Hesse, two of the three German Länder included in the
study, a certain percentage (2 % and respectively 5 %) of the block grant is linked to
the achievement of the objectives agreed upon in the performance contracts speciﬁc
to each university. However, the assessment is not very rigorous and underper-
formance is rarely sanctioned by funding cuts.
In Denmark, the development contracts are on purpose not linked to funding, but
they are nevertheless seen as an important steering mechanism also by university
management, as they can be used in discussions on the institutional strategy and
internal funding allocation. Here, the impact on institutional management very
much depends on the structure and the governance model of the institution.
A performance contract may also be used as a complementary instrument to a
funding formula either to align the contract’s objectives with the formula, or to
mitigate some of the negative effects of a formula by, for instance, setting additional
objectives for the quality of teaching and research. If it is an individual contract, this
is also the opportunity to create a dialogue between the ministry and the university,
and it can then be used as an effective management tool even if it is not directly
linked to funding.
3.3 Overview of Performance Elements in Block Grant
Allocation
A majority of systems consider their funding allocation mechanisms at least par-
tially performance-based for teaching (via graduate-related criteria), with the most
extensive case being Denmark (through its taximeter system to allocate funds for
teaching), and partially or mainly performance-based for research, where indicators
related to publications and external research funding are normally taken into
account.
Table 2 shows that a primarily input-based formula is the most common way of
block grant allocation for the systems considered in the study. However, it is often
combined with other mechanisms, such as performance contracts or budget nego-
tiations and historical allocation.
3.4 Effects of Performance-Based Funding on Higher
Education Systems
Each parameter used in the funding system, whether it is an indicator within the
funding formula or an objective in a performance contract, comes with potential
risks and unintended effects. However, there are several ways of mitigating these
risks, either within the formula, through a careful combination of different funding
mechanisms, or through other measures, such as quality assurance to counterbalance
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the negative effects. Within a funding formula, some negative effects of one indicator
might be counterbalanced, for instance, by reducing the weight of this indicator with
regard to other criteria used to determine the amount of funding. The choice of
indicators and objectives is crucial and should be motivated by a clear policy, taking
into account the diversity of institutional proﬁles. A formula or performance contract
heavily relying on one or a very small number of indicators/objectives has a stronger
steering effect, but this might also lead to a convergence of institutional proﬁles
adapting their activities accordingly, and might thus contribute to reduce institu-
tional diversity if most of the recurrent funding is allocated this way. A formula or
performance contract with more indicators or objectives addressing different uni-
versity activities might be more adequate to properly fund the broad mission of

































































Please note that when this table was made in autumn 2014, the data validation phase of the
DEFINE project was still ongoing. Therefore this classiﬁcation is provisional and might look
different in later publications
aTeaching funding only
bResearch funding only
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comprehensive universities (see also Dohmen 2014, p. 26). The articulation with
other funding instruments and modes of funding is extremely important, as it
determines the funding environment and thus the effects on institutional behaviour.
4 Funding for Excellence
In many European countries, intense pressure is exerted on the higher education
system to adapt to evolving economic and societal demands, as well as to the
“culture of excellence” necessary to operate in an increasingly internationally
competitive ﬁeld. Policy responses to these challenges take many forms. Some
countries have made extra ﬁnancial resources available to foster the emergence of
excellence “hubs” with a view to enable these entities (whether institutions, clusters
of institutions, or clusters of sub-institutional entities) to compete internationally, to
improve research and/or teaching quality, as well as to match better supply and
demand on the higher education market. However, in a context of constrained
resources, excellence schemes are also meant to increase funding efﬁciency, whe-
ther as a main objective or not. They often aim to remove inefﬁciencies and to
concentrate funding by creating hierarchies between institutions.
4.1 Characteristics of Excellence Schemes
in Higher Education
While it is common for the notion of “excellence” to be integrated in research
funding, notably through competitive funding mechanisms, it is less often attached
to broad restructuring processes.
Excellence schemes differ from regular competitive funding because they are
essentially characterised as “exceptional”, meaning that they are introduced as a
separate measure outside of the existing regular funding mechanisms, and are also
often meant to be limited in time, with, in case of perceived success, the possibility
to renew the experience.
Their scope and intended recipients are also broader than in the case of regular
competitive funding, targeting the institutional level, more often than not involving
arbitration and commitment by the institutional leadership.
In this regard, Germany’s “Exzellenzinitiative” offers a benchmark against which
other schemes can be compared. The French “Investment for the Future” scheme is
partly modelled on the German example. Both initiatives are supported by large
funds, albeit distributed through different mechanisms. These schemes are multi-fold
and reward not only research clusters, but also institutional strategies; in Germany
the scheme also funds the establishment of doctoral schools. The Spanish pro-
gramme “Campus of International Excellence” also addresses different objectives,
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among which regional integration of universities features prominently, and is built
on a combination of funding mechanisms. Elsewhere, schemes are signiﬁcantly
smaller and typically address sub-institutional entities, such as laboratories, and
usually require them to cluster or establish research consortia, as the Polish “Leading
National Research Centres” or the Norwegian “Centres of Excellent Research”. The
creation of new excellent institutions like in Austria or Finland is considered here as
well as a form of excellence funding, in particular given the concentration of
resources and the narrative surrounding these processes; ﬁnally, it may be embedded
in regular core funding, such as the Research Excellence Framework in the UK.
It is also worth noting that excellence in teaching is an objective addressed less
often than excellence in research, where the perception of international competition
is perhaps more acute. Nevertheless, some systems have set up schemes focusing on
teaching excellence. This is for instance the case of the French “IDEFI” scheme,
which funds innovative teaching, or the “Quality Pact for Teaching” in Germany,
which aims at improving the conditions of study and teaching quality.
Table 3 shows the measures included in the analysis.
4.2 Impact on Institutional Proﬁling and Restructuring
The more intense international competition for talent and for funds requires uni-
versities to make themselves more visible on the international stage, and distinguish
themselves from competitors by developing a strategic proﬁle. Excellence schemes
are an instrument available to public authorities to promote this, with strategic
proﬁling becoming a dimension of the application and granting process.
Universities are therefore encouraged to identify, strengthen and capitalise on their
strengths and assets.
Universities may invest strategically internally to create leverage effects. They
may, for instance, provide seed funding to high-potential initiatives, creating an
“internal excellence scheme” focused on the young generation. Such initiatives may
thus be seen as a stepping stone towards success in the large-scale excellence
scheme; they may also be envisaged as a corrective mechanism to perceived
Table 3 A selection of “excellence schemes” found in Europe
System Scheme
Austria Creation of Institute of Science and Technology
France Excellence Initiatives (IDEX)
Finland Centres of Excellence in Research Creation of Aalto University
Germany Excellence Initiative
Norway “Centres of Excellent Research”
Poland “Leading National Research Centres” (KNOWs)
Spain “Campus of International Excellence” Programme (CEI)
United Kingdom “Research Excellence Framework”
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shortcomings of the excellence scheme, that tend to privilege established research
teams over promising ones; disciplinary over interdisciplinary work; certain types
of academic ﬁelds over others.
This drive towards “proﬁling” or, to some extent, towards specialisation inevi-
tably creates tensions within universities which, as comprehensive institutions, have
a tradition of maintaining academic portfolios. In a context where institutions have
often struggled to keep an acceptable balance between disciplines and academic
ﬁelds, the pressure to focus on a limited number of flagship disciplines or even
niches requires a real, concerted effort and innovative decision-making in the
university.
The institution may also seek to adapt its own structure to improve its capacity to
meet the excellence scheme requirements in terms of governance and flexibility, as
well as enhance its ability to proﬁle itself strategically. It was observed in the
context of the study that restructuring tends to privilege flatter structures, sometimes
eliminating intermediary levels of management such as faculties, and also favours
reduced numbers of sub-institutional entities (larger schools/faculties/departments).
4.3 The Role of the University Leadership
In this light, the university central leadership is a key actor in all processes, from
bringing together the various communities of the institution to making strategic
decisions linked to proﬁling. The university leadership takes decisions related to the
strategic reallocation of resources, a particularly acute question since it results in
privileging particular areas or groups within the university often at the expense of
others. It is the role of the university leadership to ensure the long-term sustain-
ability of the activities funded under the excellence scheme, which by deﬁnition
offers temporary support, and therefore requires a carefully planned exit strategy.
The leadership must work towards the acceptance of sometimes difﬁcult changes
associated with restructuring and reallocation of resources. It must foster the
development of an institution-wide strategy while preserving the institutional
balance.
4.4 Exit Strategies for Institutions and Systems
Crucially, excellence schemes are viewed as time-bound initiatives to drive change,
rather than a permanent funding mechanism. While in some cases it is possible to
apply for a second grant, the underlying concept is one of temporary support.
Exit strategies are an important dimension of the sustainability challenge.
Funding received by institutions in the framework of an excellence scheme supports
additional, high-proﬁle activities that in turn create high expectations and trigger
new equipment and personnel costs.
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Universities participating in large-scale excellence schemes may thus have to
think strategically about the internal allocation of resources over the long term,
notably to make resources available to cover the non-externally funded part of the
activities, as for instance indirect costs. Excellence schemes may therefore have
extensive consequences on the internal resource management of the universities.
By the time the funds run out, the institution must have fully implemented a
leverage strategy helping to generate additional funds from private partners in order
to maintain—if not further raise—the new higher level of activity. Candidate
institutions often have to detail their sustainability plan at the stage of selection.
Public authorities and the university sector need to agree on an exit strategy for
the excellence scheme itself. All stakeholders need to consider how successfully
started initiatives may be maintained over the longer term with other types of
funders supporting the activities undertaken. This question is particularly acute in
countries where the ﬁnancial situation has signiﬁcantly deteriorated over the life-
time of the excellence scheme.
5 Efﬁciency Measures
Universities themselves contribute to shaping their environment, not only by
adapting institutional behaviour to respond to the external pressures and incentive
mechanisms set at system level, but also by actively seeking to improve their
operations at institutional level. Discussions about operational efﬁciency at insti-
tutional level are taking place in a number of systems, albeit with different narra-
tives and expectations towards universities. A more structured dialogue between
public authorities and universities about efﬁciency has developed in the UK and
Ireland, where universities themselves work as agenda-setters and proactively
started communicating about the topic (see Universities UK 2013).
5.1 Types of Efﬁciency Measures
In many systems, such measures are imbedded in universities’ day-to-day opera-
tions, but they are not explicitly referred to as efﬁciency measures. A good example
for this is the use of information and communication technology and speciﬁc
software in administrative processes, with a view to facilitate for instance enrolment
or registration for courses.
When looking at existing practices across Europe, two types can be distin-
guished, administrative and academic measures, for which some examples are given
in Table 4.
With regard to the academic practice, there is often a trade-off between efﬁciency
and the quality of teaching, for instance when universities are pressed to ensure
faster completion, which bears the risk of lowering standards to make students pass
Strategies for Efﬁcient Funding of Universities in Europe 165
exams similarly to what was described with regard to completion criteria in funding
formula. Similar pressure on the efﬁcient use of funds comes from research funders
who develop stricter scrutiny of projects and research activities. Therefore, it is all
the more important that universities are enabled to develop their own strategies
trying to balance efﬁciency and effectiveness and keeping up high quality standards.
In the administrative and the academic spheres, collaborations are a widespread
means helping to make more efﬁcient use of resources. Collaboration is sometimes
driven by external pressures or incentives. Situations vary in Europe; sector col-
laboration may be the initiative of the universities themselves, or the impulse may
be given by the public authorities. Institutions work together to secure additional
money from speciﬁc funding schemes or to obtain large research infrastructures.
Sector-level procurement is also a mechanism used in certain countries. This type of
collaboration raises speciﬁc challenges, however, in particular in relation to the
capacity to agree on the speciﬁc terms of reference. In some countries, dedicated
agencies are set up for that purpose exclusively, although institutions are not
obliged to use their services. This is important as regards the possible tension
between achieving economies of scale on the one hand, and preserving some
flexibility in the system on the other hand. Collaborative contracting with external
providers seems most widespread in the area of maintenance services (IT services,
security, catering); it seems there is ground for further collaboration in other ﬁelds.
5.2 Enabling Frameworks
The capacity of universities to implement efﬁciency measures partly depends on the
governance and management structure and the degree of (de)centralisation of the
institution. Highly decentralised structures, where faculties beneﬁt from signiﬁcant
Table 4 Examples of administrative and academic measures fostering efﬁciency
Administrative
measures
Collaboration to drive costs down like joint procurement, asset sharing,
shared services
Use of information and communication technology
Estates and facility management to reduce infrastructure costs
Financial management and full costing to better understand and
strategically reduce costs
Improvement of administrative processes




Control of student numbers
Faster completion
Rationalisation of curricula
Changes to student/staff ratio
Collaborations, such as joint programmes and research
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autonomy from the central university management, face a bigger challenge in terms
of cost efﬁciency, as the steering capacity of the central university management is
limited. In such cases, there is however scope for action at the level of streamlining
processes across sub-institutional units. There is also a case for sharing infra-
structures, including IT services, as well as launching a common procurement
process at the level of the institution. Centralised institutions have most of these
elements dealt with by the central university management and can therefore save
costs through economies of scale.
Regulatory frameworks strongly determine the capacity to develop and imple-
ment such strategies. In systems where universities do not beneﬁt from signiﬁcant
autonomy, implementing efﬁciency measures may be more difﬁcult, whether within
the institution or through cooperation mechanisms. This is relevant for all dimen-
sions of autonomy; organisational autonomy is necessary to create legal entities as
appropriate, or adapt academic structures in ways to foster synergies and lead to
efﬁciencies. Financial autonomy is a prerequisite for efﬁcient estate management
(enabling the university to own its buildings). Academic autonomy makes it pos-
sible to combine or create new programmes in a sustainable way. Finally, autonomy
in stafﬁng matters allows the university to decide on positions and salaries. It is also
worth noting that political objectives for the sector may be conflicting; when the
funding model seeks to foster competition among institutions, it may hinder
opportunities to collaborate.
6 Conclusions
Public authorities have many steering levers at their disposal to shape their higher
education systems, with a view to enhance efﬁciency. It should, however, be kept in
mind that measures such as performance-based funding and excellence schemes can
also have unintended consequences at system, as well as institutional level.
The analysis shows that funding instruments and efﬁciency measures should be
considered within the overall funding system and the particular context in which
universities operate. When designing new instruments or changing the modalities,
the political goal behind this should be clearly communicated and a long-term
perspective and a holistic view should be taken to consider also potential unin-
tended effects. A continuous consultation with the sector is crucial to ensure that the
schemes ﬁt their purpose and the needs of the institutions. Administrative proce-
dures should be kept as simple as possible; transparency of the funding instruments
and clarity of rules to all actors are equally important. It should also be clear
whether the mechanism is meant as a steering instrument to incentivise a certain
institutional behaviour or whether it is a means to redistribute a set amount of
money. If the intention is to promote a certain type of behaviour, it should be kept
in mind that most of the costs of a university’s activities are ﬁxed. In a context of
reduced public funding, there is therefore little room for manoeuvre in this respect.
Setting up adequate steering mechanisms requires either an injection of additional
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funding in the system, or freeing up resources through cost control (for example by
adapting the volume of teaching or research activities). But funding models, in turn,
can help universities in developing their own strategies to deal with changes in
funding, provided they have the necessary autonomy to do so. Additional funding
for universities can also be used to incentivise efﬁciencies at institutional level
through support for collaborations in varies areas to share services, resources or real
estate. Universities themselves should proactively engage in the development of
funding policies with policy makers to ensure that the schemes respond to their
needs.
Notwithstanding the increased need to rationalise and focus on value for money,
efﬁcient public funding models also need to provide sufﬁcient and sustainable core
funding to universities for them to properly fulﬁl their mission and respond to new
challenges and societal demands.
Further ﬁndings and outcomes of the DEFINE project, including detailed rec-
ommendations to policy makers and university leaders, are available via the project
website: http://www.eua.be/deﬁne.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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